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David Walker, Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
and the Logic of Sentimental Terror
With few exceptions, contemporary criticism reads nineteenth-century senti­mental fiction as a literature of love.1 When Harriet Beecher Stowe famously asserted that the moral growth o f the nation depended on each citizen’s ability to 
“feel right,” she voiced a sentiment shared by many of her contemporaries. It is no 
surprise, then, that scholars have assumed Stowe’s injunction to “feel right” was a 
call to feel compassion and love, for it was ostensibly through a rhetoric of Christian 
love that Stowe was able to foment a passionate outcry against slavery from many 
of her Northern readers. Indeed, sentimentalism’s transformative potential is best 
expressed in Stowe’s antislavery writing, and scholars continue to uphold her fiction 
as the paradigmatic example of nineteenth-century abolitionist sentimentality. The 
ascendancy of love as the identifiable trait of nineteenth-century sentimental writing, 
moreover, marks a crucial moment in literary criticism. Modern scholars who wanted 
to claim that a formidable feminist presence existed within the American Renaissance 
had to separate the sentimental tradition from nineteenth-century Calvinism, which 
scholars have historically equated with patriarchal power. They have thus detached 
Calvinism’s severe brand of evangelical theology, which stressed the judgment of 
God, from a feminized sentimental philosophy that emphasized salvation through 
motherly love.2 As a result, the prevailing scholarly view understands love to be the 
revolutionary impulse behind nineteenth-century sentimental reform, and critics use 
“sympathy” and “sympathetic identification” as shorthand for this process whereby 
love and compassion result from an affective bond formed across lines of difference.3
Arguments that see sympathy and love as the inevitable outcome of sentimental 
narration are founded on the widely shared assumption that quintessential senti­
mental scenes will inevitably produce quintessential sentimental responses, so that 
representations of compassion will, in turn, arouse compassion in the reader: 
sympathy will invoke sympathy, love will generate even more love. Because these 
views understand sympathy and love to be autotelic, however, they fail to recognize 
instances when sympathetic love is not the source of itself, when some other force 
is needed to guarantee its activation. Scholars have overlooked this important 
dimension of sentimental writing, even though the works of many nineteenth-century 
sentimentalists recognize that love may not be a natural or an automatic response, 
that sometimes compassion needs to be coerced. When love could not be depended 
on as a guaranteed effect, fear often served as an incentive to love, energizing love’s 
power and underwriting its potential to transform readers from fallible sinners into 
moral beings. And prophecies of a retributive God, in particular, were a familiar 
source of fear and constituted the most efficient way to politicize terror in the 
antebellum period.
Rather than continue to treat sentimental calls for love and threats of divine 
retribution as fundamentally separate and even oppositional impulses, I explore in 
this article the dramatic convergence of emergent sentimental practices with the 
fire-and-brimstone rhetoric of evangelical Christianity within nineteenth-century 
antislavery writing. I consider how pleas for love and warnings of God’s wrath 
often appear in tandem, with the latter serving as a goad for the former, and I term 
this dynamic “apocalyptic sentimentalism” precisely as a way to underscore the
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fundamental interrelation between the seemingly antithetical notions of love and 
vengeance, sympathy and retribution. Terror, as I will argue, is foundational to the 
logic of antislavery sentimentality and must be read in concert with and as an incite­
ment to love. Antislavery writers, for example, who demanded that white Americans 
sympathize with slaves, understood that simply pleading for sympathy or representing 
scenes of suffering slaves did not ensure a sympathetic response from readers.
To facilitate a compassionate identification with Negro slaves, many abolitionist 
writers used threats of God’s apocalyptic retribution to stimulate a loving response 
in readers, and this interaction, where calls for love are supported by warnings of 
divine vengeance, will come to form a common rhetorical technique within aboli­
tionist sentimentality.
Despite the prevalence of apocalyptic sentimentalism within the highly charged 
reform setting of Northern abolition, critics rarely regard this deployment of politi­
cized fear to be a sentimental gesture. They see, in other words, love and vengeance 
to be inherently and irreconcilably antagonistic. Gregg Camfield, for example, 
insists that the Scottish Common Sense tradition, which stressed “moral sense” and 
sympathy as primary ways of establishing intersubjective relations, constituted the 
epistemological source of nineteenth-century American sentimentalism. Because 
the Scottish Enlightenment developed, at least in part, in opposition to Calvinist 
doctrine, something like apocalyptic fear could not be seen as part of the grammar 
of sentimental narration. Camfield’s view is one that critics presumably share, given 
that none has described fear as sentimental affect.4 What Camfield’s argument misses, 
however, are the ways in which nineteenth-century sentimentality is profoundly 
energized by the evangelical fervor of the Second Great Awakening. Despite 
challenges to Calvinist theology that occurred throughout the early part of the 
nineteenth century by more moderate denominations like the Methodists and 
Baptists,3 representations of apocalypse— often constructed through fire-and- 
brimstone rhetoric and warnings of retribution and judgment—nevertheless remained 
and proliferated across denominational lines. This was especially true within abolition, 
where the apocalypse was deployed as a political category (and not merely a theo­
logical one) that antislavery radicals used to inspire a properly Christian response 
from their audiences: sympathize with and learn to love America’s slaves or suffer 
the wrath of God.
I explore the interplay between calls for sympathy and love with threats of 
divine wrath and vengeance by way of an unlikely pairing: David Walker and Harriet 
Beecher Stowe. In part one, I illustrate how Walker’s Appeal helped to establish some 
of the foundational narrative structures and tropes of antislavery sentimentalism, 
thus serving as an instructive model for reading fear as a sentimental mode in the 
antebellum period. Rather than keeping the sentimental in an antagonistic relation­
ship to apocalyptic theology, I will demonstrate how Walker marshals the mutually 
enforcing affects of love and terror, thus energizing his pleas for sympathy and 
compassion with threats of apocalyptic retribution for those who fail to renounce 
slavery. Walker’s Appeal constitutes one of the earliest examples of this dynamic, 
malting him a forerunner of apocalyptic sentimentalism. Radicalized within the 
African Methodist Episcopal Church of Charleston, South Carolina in the era of 
Denmark Vesey, David Walker portends catastrophic consequences for America’s 
slaveholders, even as he somewhat surprisingly adumbrates a theory of sympathy 
that might save the nation from complete ruin.6 Traditionally viewed as a love-based, 
often melodramatic domestic ideology, abolitionist sentimentality had a ruthless and 
vengeful streak running through it, a streak that is not ancillary or accidental but 
constitutive of its very makeup.
In part two, I investigate Harriet Beecher Stowe’s second major antislavery novel, 
Dred; A  Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, in order to demonstrate how the most famous 
sentimentalist of the nineteenth century replicates Walker’s sentimental structure in
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her own fiction, using fear of God’s apocalyptic vengeance to inspire sympathy and 
compassion in her readers. Reading Walker and Stowe together in this way, I explore 
how terror is a fundamental affect within abolitionist sentimentality, a reality that 
scholars have obscured by obsession with the primacy of love at the complete 
exclusion of theological wrath. I also examine how sentimental discourse has roots 
in a burgeoning black literary tradition as well as suggests that gendered spheres in 
the nineteenth century and the modes of discourse that characterize them (fire-and- 
brimstone for the masculine sphere, love and sentiment for the feminine) may be 
more permeable than scholars have assumed. In one final and related point, I argue 
that in addition to sanitizing the sentimental by completely submerging terror, 
modern critics have fundamentally mischaracterized the forms of violence that 
appear in these texts. Against these critics, who read scenes of resistance in the 
Appeal and Dred as examples of “revolutionary” violence, I instead contend that 
Walker and Stowe are more committed to a form of terror-inducing, scripturally 
sanctioned religious violence. Revolutionary violence and theological vengeance are 
not necessarily the same thing, in other words, and while exploring the productive 
uses of religiously motivated terror and violence is a challenging task in our post-9/II 
world, we cannot avoid such an undertaking, especially when the sentimental tradition 
I describe in this article is deeply invested in the possibility of divine retribution and 
the fear that this possibility engenders as a proper response to slavery. Indeed, full 
engagement with sentimental terror as I propose may illuminate a useful framework 
for thinking about rhetorics of terror that mark the contemporary moment.7
Terror and Sentiment
But why are the Americans so very fearfully terrified respecting my Book?” (Appeal 72). This question, posed by David Walker about his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, will no doubt strike modern readers as disingenuous, 
given what we know about the effects his work had throughout the slaveholding 
South. Once the Appeal began circulating, officials arrested anyone who possessed 
copies of the document. Laws were enacted quarantining Northern black sailors in 
order to prevent them from disseminating Walker’s polemic or any other literature 
thought to agitate slaves or endanger the autonomy of the planter class. In fact, 
Southern authorities were in such a state of agitation that prohibitions against black 
literacy were reinvigorated and earnestly enforced.® As one writer in the North Star 
put it, “This little book produced more commotion among slaveholders than any 
volume of its size that was ever issued from an American press” (Henry Highland 
Garnet qtd. in Appeal 4). Indeed, the Appeal was the most incendiary attack against 
slavery in the antebellum period, and it achieved this status by constructing a 
rhetoric of terror that both portended bloody insurrection and linked ideas of slave 
rebellion with prophecies of God’s apocalyptic retribution. “Perhaps,” warns Walker 
in a paradigmatic example of this linkage, “they will laugh at or make light of this; 
but I tell you Americans! that unless you speedily alter your course, you and your 
Country are gone!! ! ! ! !  For God Almighty will tear up the very face of the earth!!!” 
(39; original emphasis). Warnings such as this one pervade the Appeal and inflamed 
the anxieties of Southerners, many of whom would have remembered Gabriel 
Prosser’s and Denmark Vesey’s thwarted but nevertheless alarming attempts at 
insurrection, and wondered if similar rebellions were being organized in which 
slaves would ultimately succeed in killing their masters.
Scholarly readings of the Appeal must inevitably account for Walker’s deeply 
divisive and highly inflammatory language, and critics often treat Walker’s meditations
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on theological wrath as a metonym for revolutionary black resistance. Gene Andrew 
Jarrett, Robert Levine, and Jeremy Engles have all recently contended that Walker’s 
theory of slave resistance aligns with what Maggie Sale has succinctly identified as 
the “trope of revolutionary struggle” (6). Walker’s emphatic critique of Jefferson’s 
racialist views in Notes on the State of Virginia as well as his co-option of the Declaration 
of Independence (the revolutionary document par excellence) only further underscores 
his apparent investment in revolutionary modes of critique. In the way Walker 
engages Jefferson’s ideas on freedom, ideas that form the bedrock of American 
liberal selfhood, it would appear that he is deliberately locating himself within a 
genealogy of revolution that traces back to the nation’s founding.9 As Eric J. 
Sundquist has argued, “African American writers such as [Frederick] Douglass, 
[Martin] Delany, [David] Walker, William Wells Brown, and Harriet Jacobs” were 
deeply invested in strategies for resisting enslavement and “had been quick to link 
slavery [and slave resistance] to its complex revolutionary heritage” (29)}® Critics 
continue to read Walker specifically, and nineteenth-century arguments supporting 
slave insurrection more generally, as signs that antebellum black Americans were 
revolutionaries insofar as they opposed institutions that violated rights intrinsic to 
nature and guaranteed by God, confirming, in Wendell Phillips’s words, that “colored 
men” like Walker are “patriotic— though denied a country:— and all show a wish, 
on their part, to prove themselves men, in a land whose laws refuse to recognise 
their manhood” (Nell 8). The story o f America’s revolutionary origins remains a 
favorite among modern critics as a way to frame how the most subversive abolitionists 
justified violence as a chief mechanism for emancipating Negro slaves.11
While most scholars have treated evangelical theology as a cooperative world­
view in the service of revolution, I want to separate them in this article in order to 
contextualize the terror that Walker’s blazing religious discourse engendered. Ideas 
regarding the slaves’ revolutionary agency, which have been a particular obsession 
among critics for at least the past forty years, tend to submerge the terror that apoca­
lyptic prophecy is intended to produce. When scholars marshal the “revolutionary” 
as an ideological category, they invoke a set of associations, specifically liberal rights, 
democratic citizenship, and the inherent equality of all persons. Those scholars who 
avow Walker often do so by normalizing the violence he promotes, claiming that he 
is a “revolutionary” in the eighteenth-century understanding of this notion. By making 
violence revolutionary and not theological or merely retributive, critics unwittingly 
temper Walker’s incendiary presence by placing him in a tradition in which violence 
was necessary to preserve the self-evident freedoms that inhere in all persons. Anyone 
who fights for these rights, including Negro slaves, is identified as a revolutionary, 
so that revolutionary violence is understood to be a rational phenomenon and 
indicator of the Enlightenment push towards the perfectibility of the human spirit. 
Revolutionary violence, then, is not destabilizing or destructive in these views, but 
normative and constructive of a world where all persons enjoy the rights and privi­
leges of citizenship. Given that most slaves were desirous of freedom and equality, 
and in light of scholarly interest in the forms of nineteenth-century slave resistance, 
it makes sense that modern critics would apply a revolutionary framework to interpret 
acts of violent resistance. As a result of their fixation on the revolutionary, however, 
scholars have left very litde room for discussing the emotionality of those arguments 
that, like Walker’s, are predicated on apocalyptic terror.
Rather than equating black violence with revolutionary resistance, I want to 
return to the rhetoric of terror that is so emblematic of Walker’s Appeal and that 
made it such a dangerous document in the antebellum period. Even though it is not 
typically identified as an example of sentimental writing and often appears more 
concerned with punishing slaveholders than it does with inspiring in them feelings 
of love and compassion, the Appeal stands as an influential model for the kind of 
antislavery argument that depends on fear to stir affective bonds between black and 
white Americans, bonds that may in turn catalyze a change in or even a dismantling
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of the slave system. Walker’s plea is designed to establish a form of sympathetic 
connection between his white audience and the slaves that they oppress, and he relies 
throughout the Appeal on what will become by midcentury a classic strategy for 
sentimental writers: an address as directed toward his readers’ hearts. Walker 
announces to his audience early in the Appeal that, with God’s help, he will “open 
[their] hearts to understand and believe the truth” (Appeal 1) of the slave’s degradation 
and the need for Southerners to relinquish their slaveholding practices. “I appeal to 
every man of feeling” (10), says Walker, suggesting that moral reform begins with 
feeling right, a view that Harriet Beecher Stowe will codify twenty years later in 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Walker reasons that a man who witnesses firsthand the slave’s 
burden, provided he is “not a tyrant, but has the feelings of a human being, who 
can feel for a fellow creature” will surely “see enough to make his very heart bleed” 
(21). The bleeding heart is a sympathetic heart, and redressing slavery begins for 
Walker as it will begin for so many antislavery reformers who adopt sentimental 
conventions: with appeals to emotion and calls for the reformation of feeling.
Walker believes that white and black Americans can learn to live together harmo­
niously, provided a proper affective bond between them can be constituted. Indeed, 
his ultimate goal in the Appeal is a racially integrated nation in which blacks enjoy 
the same respect and rights as citizens that whites enjoy. “Treat us like men,” says 
Walker, “and there is no danger but we will all live in peace and happiness together.
. .. Treat us like men, and we will be your friends” (Appeal 70). Given the Appeals 
angry rhetoric, it would be easy to overlook Walker’s reconciliatory vision, where 
racial segregation and acrimony are overcome in favor of amity between all citizens, 
regardless of skin color. Walker remains emphatic, though, in his desire for unity, 
assuring readers that any misgivings they may have are unfounded, and underscoring 
interraciality as a necessary national ethos as well as a real political possibility. “And 
there is not a doubt in my mind,” Walker states, “but that the whole of the past will 
be sunk into oblivion, and we yet, under God, will become a united and happy people. 
The whites may say it is impossible, but remember that nothing is impossible with 
God” (70). Notwithstanding the hardships they have suffered under slavery, black 
Americans will surrender the past in order to realize a more promising future. It 
could be said, then, that the aim of the Appeal is nothing less than the creation of a 
racially heterogeneous but nevertheless unified nation state that is sanctioned by 
God and federated by feeling, with each citizen affectively associated with every 
other citizen.
Even as he unfolds this vision in which a compassionate white audience feels 
for black slaves, and this sentimental solidarity in turn leads to national unity, Walker 
faces a problem, one that antislavery reformers and sentimental writers throughout 
the 1840s and ’50s would continue to face: namely, that white Americans are simply 
not feeling for or sympathizing with slaves, regardless of how pitiable or deplorable 
the slaves’ circumstances might be. Calling for sympathy, in other words, or repre­
senting scenes that are meant to elicit a compassionate response from white readers, 
is not necessarily going to achieve the desired effect. Walker explicitly engages the 
failure of white Americans to sympathize with slaves and their willingness to take 
the slaves’ wretchedness as a fact of nature and a reflection of God’s will. “But the 
Americans,” says Walker, “having introduced slavery among them, their hearts have 
become almost seared, as with an hot iron, and God has nearly given them up to 
believe a lie in preference to the tru th!!!” {Appeal 43). Instead of enabling whites to 
bond with and learn to care for blacks, white hearts have been hardened by slavery 
and have thus lost their capacity to facilitate feeling. Walker cannot simply appeal to 
the hearts of white readers when these hearts no longer perform their primary 
function as repositories of emotion and agents of sympathetic identification. Walker 
needs some corrective measure to activate white sympathy and to calibrate these
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sympathies with their proper object, and he finds this measure in the threat of 
God’s vengeance, a threat that immediately follows the preceding passage:
And I am awfully afraid that pride, prejudice, avarice and blood, will, before long prove the 
final ruin of this happy republic, or land of liberty! !! ! . . .  Will the Lord suffer this people to 
go on much longer, taking his holy name in vain? Will he not stop them, PREACHERS and 
all? O Americans! O Americans! ! I call God—I call angels—I call men, to witness, that 
your DESTRUCTION is at hand, and will be speedily consummated unless you REPENT.
(43; original emphasis)
Warnings like this one of God’s apocalyptic retribution can be found throughout 
the Appeal, underscoring that terror and love are inseparably linked, with the former 
serving as an incitement to and prerequisite for the latter. What may seem counter­
intuitive to modern readers is precisely what Walker regards as self-evident: love is 
not an absolute or self-sufficient emotion, but rather requires a threat to activate its 
power. Walker appreciates that hearts do not necessarily sympathize independently, 
but instead require some reason to feel. His own theory of sentiments is structured 
such that the threat of God’s retributive wrath, and the fear that this threat engenders, 
will motivate whites to feel and perhaps even learn to care for blacks. Like later 
works of sentimental narrative, Walker’s argument is predicated on a sympathetic 
connection that is rooted in deeply felt emotion, but unlike scholarly claims that 
understand love and sympathy to be autogenic, Walker positions fear as a necessary 
inspiration for sympathetic affection. America can only achieve a multiracial union 
when whites are bonded by sympathy to their black brethren, and this sympathetic 
connection will only be established if it is energized by the fear of divine vengeance.
Walker inscribes the apocalyptic as both a theological prophecy and a sentimental 
register, combining established religious ideas regarding God’s judgment with 
emergent sentimental ones. Indeed, fire-and-brimstone rhetoric and representations 
of retribution and judgment— familiar early nineteenth-century conceptions of 
apocalypse that helped form a powerful epistemology within the evangelical culture 
of the Second Great Awakening—are designed to inspire an emotional response in 
the reader, and it is on this level of affect that the sentimental and the apocalyptic 
converge. Walker’s repeated use of violent and bloody imagery is grounded in the 
highly charged political and cultural climate in which his antislavery sensibilities 
matured. His participation in the AME Church in Charleston, and his possible 
involvement in the Denmark Vesey plot no doubt made a formative impression on 
his thinking about violent rebellion. 2 Like Vesey, Walker’s notions of rebellion are 
thoroughly based on Scripture and modeled on those passages from the Bible that 
portray God smiting unregenerate sinners in all of his apocalyptic fury.13 Walker 
summons the apocalyptic, not merely to challenge the institution of slavery, but also 
to inspire terror in his audience by invoking a wrathful divinity that has promised to 
mete out punishment. The forms of violence Walker depicts are not meant to 
replace a tyrannical form of governance with a benevolent one, as is suggested in 
the Declaration of Independence. To the extent that it is figured apocalyptically, 
violence in Walker’s Appeal is widespread, bloody, and complete, with God separating 
the saints from the sinners, the wheat from the chaff.
Surprisingly, these same representations of a violent Biblical apocalypse also 
constitute some of the paradigmatic sentimental expressions of the antebellum 
period, and Walker’s invocations of God’s vengeance function in the Appeal as an 
indispensable blueprint for sentimental persuasion.14 It is precisely because com­
passion and fear are paired in this way that one often finds in the Appeal lamentations 
about a lack of love in whites immediately followed by threats of God’s wrath.
One emotional economy bolsters the other. “I hope that the Americans may hear,” 
pleads Walker, “but I am afraid that they have done us so much injury, and are so 
firm in the belief that our Creator made us to be an inheritance to them for ever,
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that their hearts will be hardened, so that their destruction may be surd’ (Appeal 40; emphasis 
added). Hardened hearts are poor conductors of sympathy, and instead of merely 
depicting scenes of the slaves’ sorrow, as if images of a suffering slave could some­
how guarantee a sympathetic response, Walker reminds his readers of the destructive 
consequences that will ensue if they do not reform their sentiments. “This language,” 
Walker continues, “perhaps is too harsh for the American’s delicate ears. But Oh 
Americans! Americans!! I warn you in the name of the Lord, (whether you will hear, 
or forbear,) to repent and reform, or you are ruined! !!” (45). Fear resuscitates 
unresponsive hearts and is targeted at those Americans who exist furthest outside 
the bonds of sympathy and compassion. “For I declare to you. . .,” says Walker, 
“that there are some on this continent of America, who will never be able to repent. 
God will surely destroy them, to show you his disapprobation of the murders they 
and you have inflicted on us” (69). Acknowledging the problem of readers who are 
disinclined to feel compassion for slaves and who consequentially must be provoked 
into penitence, Walker encourages an antislavery approach in which inspiring readers 
to “feel right” entails first making them afraid so that they may avoid the apocalyptic 
repercussions that in his Appeal seem so inevitable.
And it is precisely the inevitability of apocalypse/insurrection that makes 
Walker’s Appeal such a terrifying indictment of slavery. Given how emphatic Walker 
renders his threats (the capital letters, the frequent use of exclamation points, etc.), 
there is a sense that it is almost too late, that the nation is precipitously close to the 
edge, and that what Walker really desires is to give America a shove into bloodshed 
and torment. It is typically at this moment that scholars retreat from the full impli­
cations of the Appeal argument, claiming Walker as a revolutionary in order to allay 
the anxiety that comes with full realization that he is championing an antislavery 
response founded on terror and religious violence that does not accord with 
American liberal ideals. Robert Levine, for instance, avoids the reading of Walker I 
am offering here. Acknowledging that the Appeal ends with an enthusiastic call for 
“black vengeance,” Levine nevertheless claims that Walker’s ideas of violence are 
fundamentally informed by his reading of the Declaration of Independence (107). 
Levine highlights the way Walker marshals the Declaration as part of his critique of 
the nation’s hypocrisy, but he nevertheless overlooks how the examples he quotes 
from the Appeal show Walker referring to America’s founding document as “your 
Declaration of Independence” and “your language” and “their Declaration” (107,110; 
emphases added). Walker suggests, in other words, that he does not share a common 
language of freedom with white Americans; nor do his ideas of liberty and resistance 
originate from the same ideological source. And why should they? America already 
had one revolution, and it did nothing to improve the lives of America’s slaves. 
Given the failure of America’s revolutionary history as it bears on slavery, it stands 
to reason that Walker would adopt an alternative world-view in order to theorize 
new modes of resistance. In fact, as I have been arguing, Walker is much more 
indebted to the emancipatory potential of radical Christianity than he is the 
Declaration of Independence— a point that is concealed when apocalypse and 
evolution are treated as synonyms, or when the theological is so thoroughly subsumed 
by the revolutionary that it is barely distinguishable from its privileged counterpart.15
The terrifying prescience of Walker’s words was amplified with Nat Turner’s 
insurrection in 1831 and the subsequent publication of his Confessions. Turner repre­
sents the incarnated threat that Walker prophesied only two years earlier. And in the 
way it articulates an affiliation between apocalyptic prophecy and violent responses 
to slavery, Nat Turner’s Confessions constitutes an important companion text to 
Walker’s Appeal. Indeed, what makes the historical moment in which the Appeal and 
Confessions appear so powerful is the combined statement on apocalyptic fear that 
each makes. Turner’s Confessions also serves as a useful bridge linking David Walker 
to Harriet Beecher Stowe, given that Stowe will directly engage with the historical
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problem of Turner in her second major work of antislavery fiction, Dred. The theo­
logical terror that operates in Walker’s Appeal and Turner’s Confessions is equally a 
part of Stowe’s intellectual and aesthetic itineraries; she is always threatening God’s 
judgment, always prophesying apocalyptic destruction. And Turner is a formative 
and abiding presence in Stowe’s sentimental imagination, so much so that she 
includes much of Turner’s confession in the first Appendix of Dred. Unlike Turner, 
however, whose “object” was to “carry terror and devastation” wherever he went, 
and whose sole intent was to “strike terror to the inhabitants” (50-51), Stowe fuses 
images that inspire terror with calls for compassion and love, articulating a sentimen­
tality in which fear and love constitute the emotional foundation of moral reform.
Dred and the Sentimental Apocalypse
Published only four years after Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Stowe’s second major anti­slavery novel, Dred appeared just as some of the most controversial and divisive issues within the slavery crisis were unfolding, such as the passage of the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act (1854), South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks’s beating of 
abolitionist Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on the Senate floor, and John 
Brown’s raids in Kansas (both 1856), and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dred Scott 
v. Sanford (1857). In many ways, the novel attempts to explore fictionally what was 
occurring within America’s cultural, political, and legal landscapes.16 For the first 
seventeen chapters, the novel portrays “ordinary” life in Canema, a pleasant and 
typically Southern plantation, and focuses specifically on Nina, a young, white 
Southern heiress, and her romantic relationships, especially the one she entertains 
with Edward Clayton. Given the novel’s title, Dred’s arrival in the eighteenth chapter 
might have seemed surprisingly late to Stowe’s readers. Even as the novel paints this 
portrait of idyllic Southern life, however, those readers realize some two hundred 
pages into the narrative that Dred has been there the entire time. He lurks on the 
margins and in the swamp, waiting for the opportunity to exact vengeance on the 
white slaveholding South. In the pages that follow, I argue that Dred, a plotting 
insurrectionist who repeatedly portends apocalyptic destruction to Southern slave­
holders, does not exist outside of the sentimental or in conflict with it, but in fact 
becomes precisely the engine o f the sentimental as Stowe constructs it in this narrative. 
Indeed, following David Walker, Stowe uses the threat of insurrectionary violence 
as a way to motivate her readers to reform their views about slavery. In this way, she 
further develops the rhetoric of apocalyptic sentimentality that Walker first outlined 
in his Appeal, where warnings of God’s (or the slave’s) retributive wrath are meant 
to inspire in white readers sympathy and compassion for black slaves. As her most 
audacious gesture, Stowe sentimentalizes the legacy of Nat Turner, transforming 
insurrection into a foundational component of the nineteenth-century sentimental 
imagination.17
Near the halfway point of the novel, Stowe gives her readers the most resounding 
statement regarding the apocalyptic dimension of Dred’s sentimentality. At a large 
camp-meeting near the Canema plantation, Nina Gordon and Edward Clayton listen 
to one of Father Bonnie’s impassioned sermons. “I tell you the Lord is looking now 
down on you,” Father Bonnie proclaims, “out o f that moon! He is looking down in 
mercy! But, I tell you, he’ll look down quite another way, one of these days! O, there’ll 
be a time of wrath, by and by, if you don’t repent!” With language emblematic of 
the Jeremianic tradition, Father Bonnie warns, “There’s a judgment-day for you!
O, sinner, what will become of you in that day? Never cry, Lord, Lord! Too late— 
too late, man! You wouldn’t take mercy when it was offered, and now you shall have
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wrath!” (Dred 259).18 The terrifying threats contained in Father Bonnie’s sermon 
inspire Nina Gordon, the novel’s heroine, to ask what is, essentially, the foundational 
question regarding sentimentalism within the novel: “Can fear of fire make me 
love?” (261). For Nina, the question of whether fear is a necessary dimension of 
affect in the creation of a loving Christian heart is an urgent one in light of Father 
Bonnie’s warning to sinners that they are running out of time. Clayton’s response to 
Nina is telling: “If we may judge our Father by his voice in nature,” Clayton says,
“he deems severity a necessary part of our training. Fire and hail, snow and vapor, 
stormy wind, fulfilling his word—all these have crushing regularity in the movements, 
which show that he is to be feared as well as loved” (261).
This exchange between Nina and Clayton illuminates a disjunction that has 
occurred between Stowe’s time and our own. That is, what for Stowe and her 
contemporaries was axiomatic remains for many modern readers a paradox that must 
be explained away or ignored: namely, that the Biblical god is simultaneously loving 
and vengeful, merciful and brimming with fury. Stowe harmonizes these ostensibly 
competing impulses, and Dred is a novel that expands upon the sentimental structure 
I described in Walker’s Appeal, where theological terror was used to bolster love 
when love was either lacking or not present at all. While love is the ultimate goal of 
sentimentalism, one cannot assume it will appear simply by invoking it. This reality 
concerning the unreliability of love would have been especially important to someone 
like Stowe, who was convinced that America was on the precipice of disaster over 
its inability or reluctance to resolve the slavery issue in a way that conformed to what 
she understood to be the indisputable moral tenets of Christianity.
That readers continue to overlook this structuring of the sentimental in Stowe’s 
antislavery fiction can be seen in the way they privilege the authority of the character 
Milly at the exclusion of Dred. Because of the way Milly proselytizes an ethic of 
Christian love, readers continue to champion her as the purest expression of senti­
mentality in the novel. In fact, many scholars completely evade considering Dred as 
a sentimental figure by separating Dred from the sentimental dynamics of the novel, 
treating him as a black revolutionary, even though virtually every word he speaks is 
about the fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecy, not revolution.19 The most powerful 
piece of “evidence” readers use to discount Dred’s importance in favor of Milly’s is 
the scene in which Milly interrupts a meeting between Dred and his co-conspirators, 
and ultimately “dissuades” them from choosing violent insurrection as a means of 
dismantling slavery. “If dere must come a day of vengeance,” says Milly to those in 
attendance, “pray not to be in it! It’s de Lord’s strange work” {Dred 461). She implores 
them to reconsider, exclaiming, “O, brethren, dere’s a better way.. .  . Leave de 
vengeance to him. Vengeance is mine— I will repay, saith de Lord” (461, 462). To her 
injunctions against violence, Dred replies, ‘Woman, thy prayers have prevailed for 
this time! The hour is not yet come!” (462). Dred’s apparent hesitation has led 
scholars like Joan Hedrick to conclude that “Dred’s Old Testament militancy is stilled 
by the words of Milly” (259) and Charles Foster to argue that Milly accomplishes 
the “conversion of Dred to Christian pacifism” (85). Based on the supposed 
supremacy of Milly’s moral compass, John Carlos Rowe has even asserted that she 
is the “fictional persona for Stowe herself” (50).
It is understandable why critics would assume that Dred and Milly occupy anti­
thetical positions, and that Stowe ultimately favors the former over the latter. Against 
these views, however, I would argue instead that these two characters actually work 
in concert to structure the sentimental foundation of this narrative. Dred’s wrath 
and the fear that it produces is meant to incite an abiding commitment to compassion 
and forgiveness exemplified by Milly, and these two affective energies are more 
symbiotic than they are oppositional. Stowe favors neither Milly nor Dred, but instead 
constructs these characters to exemplify the Biblical figure of Jesus, a being who is 
both loving and vengeful, capable of mercy and prepared to mete out punishment.
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In other words, Stowe does not use Milly and Dred to present two dichotomous 
paths, one leading to sympathy and love, the other to violence and retribution. Just 
because Dred concedes to Milly that the hour has not yet come does not mean that 
it will not, but only that Dred is willing to wait for a sign from God that the moment 
to insurrect has arrived. Once readers understand the affective dynamic that is created 
by the interaction of Dred and Milly, where the terror embodied by Dred is meant 
to goad the love espoused by Milly, they will more easily recognize and appreciate 
the countless examples throughout Dred where scenes foregrounding love and com­
passion run adjacent to and are motivated by moments that invoke wrath and woe, 
much like they did in Walker’s Appeal.
If Dred is so crucial to the sentimentality of the narrative, however, why does 
Stowe kill him off before he can exact vengeance against slaveholders? Why does 
he never receive the sign he was so sure God would deliver to him to initiate violent 
rebellion (and that Nat Turner was so certain he did receive)? Why is it only Milly 
who is able to live out her days in relative freedom in New York? The killing of Dred 
may look like Stowe’s ultimate disavowal of a character who symbolized hope for 
America’s slaves, but who posed a threat that in the end Stowe found to be untenable. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that some readers have criticized Stowe for failing to 
depict a slave revolt.20 The problem, in other words, is that Stowe is unable to follow 
her own antislavery politics to their logical conclusion. She lacks the courage to depict 
a rebellion in which slaveholders finally suffer for their sins. This view, however, 
misses the point entirely. Stowe does not depict Dred and his co-conspirators 
committing acts of violence because her solution to slavery is a sentimental one, 
not one predicated on slave rebellion. By threatening insurrection throughout the 
narrative, and by linking insurrection to apocalyptic prophecy, Stowe aims to inspire 
fear in her readers, fear that will in turn motivate them to love Negro slaves and 
reject slaveholding. This is the sentimental structure of Stowe’s political response.
If, however, she depicts Dred committing actual acts of violence— if she represents 
his co-conspirators killing white people— then these slaves will become, in the eyes 
of white readers, insurgents that are undeserving of sympathetic love. Slaves will be 
seen not as worthy of compassion (which would be the proper sentimental response), 
but as a threat that needs to be eradicated, perhaps even preemptively. By representing 
insurrection and not simply threatening it, Stowe would, in effect, undermine the 
very sentimental response that she has been trying to construct all along. An insur­
rectionary apocalypse functions best as a threat, not as an actual event. If Stowe 
promotes an antislavery view that advocates slave violence, she endangers what is 
for her a foremost concern: shaping a nation of readers that loves as Christ did 
and thus rejects America’s most immoral practice. Unlike Walker, who would have 
welcomed insurrection and in many ways wrote the Appeal in order to hasten the 
end of days, Stowe suspends the threat by removing Dred from the narrative. Walker 
intimates that it may already be too late for slaveholding Americans. Stowe, however, 
wants to sustain the possibility of redemption, but in order to do so she must elimi­
nate the only agent who could prematurely foreclose any possibility of reform.
The specter of slave violence does not end with the death of Dred, however.
As a way to remind her readers of the very real dangers of slaveholding, Stowe 
concludes the narrative by appending an excerpt of Nat Turner’s Confessions. In this 
way, Stowe not only links the fictional characters in Dred with the historical actors 
who participated in the Southampton revolt. She also returns to one of the most 
apocalyptic figures of the antebellum period who, in turn, “produces” one of the 
most apocalyptic texts of the entire nineteenth century.21 As Stowe remarks, “ [one] 
of the principal conspirators” in the Turner-led insurrection was a man named 
Dred, and if readers are to understand Stowe’s fictional creation, they must first 
consider one of the historical sources on which she bases her protagonist. Dred’s
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language in many ways parallels Turner’s (and Walker’s). As Turner says, “ [On] the 
12™ of May, 1828,1 heard a loud noise in the heavens, and the Spirit instantly 
appeared to me and said the Serpent was loosened, and Christ had laid down the 
yoke he had borne for the sins of men, and that I should take it on and fight against 
the Serpent, for the time was fast approaching when the first should be last and the 
last should be first” (Dred 557). Unlike Dred, Turner receives the sign from heaven 
that the bloodshed can begin, and his “object” from that moment on is “to carry 
terror and devastation wherever” he goes, and “neither age nor sex was to be 
spared—which was invariably adhered to” (558). Turner gets to do what Dred was 
never permitted— usher in the violence. Stowe appends Turner’s Confessions precisely 
to underscore the point that Americans can expect real bloodshed, and not simply 
fictional warnings of it, if they fail to end slavery. Stowe cites Turner’s Confessions in 
order to make a moral argument against slavery, a move that has confounded 
modern readers who want to claim her as a paragon of love-based sentimentality and 
who have had to exclude Dred (and ignore Turner) as a product of her sentimental 
imagination in order to do so.
Even as she uses Turner to sustain the possibility of insurrectionary violence, 
Stowe refuses to portray it, even though she is not responsible for Turner’s actions 
the way she would be for Dred’s. As in Dred, the violence is cleansed from Turner’s 
confession. In the excerpt Stowe appends, Turner proceeds to describe the details 
of his violent rebellion through Southampton County, Virginia. Just as he begins to 
address the acts in question, the narrative voice interposes, saying, ‘We will not go 
into the horrible details of the various massacres, but only make one or two extracts, 
to show the spirit and feelings of Turner” (Dred 558). While Stowe redacts Turner’s 
account for the purposes of her narrative and excises the most violent parts, her 
readers would have been acutely aware of Turner’s original statement, namely those 
passages from his account that detail the lulling of the Travises, especially the infant 
“sleeping in a cradle” (Turner 49). This is the outcome towards which America is 
headed, with Turner acting the part of God wreaking havoc within the slaveholding 
community.
While modern readers— and even some of Stowe’s contemporaries— might 
justifiably point out the naivete or ineffectiveness of Stowe’s argument, it is never­
theless imperative that we see Stowe’s solution to be a decidedly sentimental one in 
the way it uses threats of violent reprisal to compel readers into nurturing a loving 
and sympathetic disposition. Between the death of Dred and the appearance of 
Turner, fhere is a narrative space where reform can occur. That is, Dred’s passing does 
not mean that Americans have nothing left to fear because while Dred represents a 
fictional apocalypse, what is coming may be much worse and no longer imaginary.22 
For this reason, Stowe sustains the possibility of reform far more persistently than 
Walker ever would. As much as she may believe America is headed towards a terrible 
but just end, it is an end Stowe would nevertheless prefer to avoid. Her sentimental 
solution to slavery is meant to stave off the impending apocalypse, whereas Walker 
suggests that an apocalypse is precisely what is needed for America’s sins to be 
purged. While Stowe and Walker share a common rhetorical style, where fear acts as 
an incitement to love, there is a divergence in the outcomes each writer is willing to 
entertain, a divergence that is no doubt informed by their racial, gender, and class 
positions, and the larger literary contexts from which they write. The fact that 
Walker is a free black writing in a racially segregated and economically stratified 
Boston in 1829, and Stowe a middle-class white woman from a prominent family 
writing in the 1850s informs the way they would have explored violence as a 
response to slavery, and determines how far they would be willing to promote 
bloodshed as a legitimate form of resistance.
DAVID WALKER, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, AND THE LOGIC OF SENTIMENTAL TERROR 265
Conclusion: Apocalyptic Sentimentalism
This sentimental configuration, in which threats of apocalyptic destruction are used to motivate sympathetic connections, will surface throughout the anti­slavery discourses of the antebellum period. Writers as varied in their aesthetic and 
political sensibilities as Maria Stewart, William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, 
and Martin Delany will imitate Walker’s and Stowe’s sentimental model, accompanying 
calls for love with terrifying images of God’s vengeance, using fear of God’s wrath 
as a sentimental support system for sympathy and compassion. And while it might 
initially seem strange to regard him as a precursor to a form of sentimentalism, it is 
important to locate Walker at the beginning of the tradition I have been describing 
in this article. The first sustained critique of slavery by an African American, 
Walker’s Appeal preludes a trend within American sentimental culture where calls for 
greater love are conjoined with and motivated by threats of apocalyptic retribution. 
Sentimental culture is often thought to be a middle-class phenomenon, and literary 
sentimentalism a style that blossomed among white, midcentury, bourgeois women. 
Reading Walker on the threshold of this blossoming helps us frame and explain the 
emotional dynamism of his argument, a topic that has been sorely neglected by 
critics. Such a perspective should also help us revise our views about the racial and 
class origins of American sentimentalism so that we begin to see its emergence 
rooted in white and black forms of representation. As a forerunner of apocalyptic 
sentimentalism, Walker’s Appeal expands the category of the sentimental and should 
be read alongside lesser-known, but no less important African American writers 
who share aspects of Walker’s approach, such as Maria Stewart, Jarena Lee, and 
Rebecca Cox Jackson, as well as the more well-known sentimentalists, like Harriet 
Beecher Stowe. Indeed, by establishing this link between Walker and Stowe, and by 
recognizing that a rhetorical style present in Walker’s Appeal reappears in Stowe’s 
antislavery fiction, we are forced to reassess what we mean when we deploy the term 
“sentimentalism,” beginning with our ideas about sentimentalism’s relationship to 
evangelical theology. Rather than existing outside of or in conflict with sentimentalism, 
it appears instead that prophecies of apocalypse helped to shape the very formation 
of nineteenth-century abolitionist sentimentalism.
The contexts surrounding Walker’s Appeal and Stowe’s Dred resonate perhaps 
somewhat uncomfortably with our contemporary moment, where Americans grapple 
daily with the global politics of terror and the disastrous consequences that ensue 
when these politics are brought to their logical conclusion. O f course, not all forms 
of terror are the same.23 Terror is neither a prepolitical nor a transcendental category, 
but is instead deeply historical. Dred and the Appeal were produced at a particular 
moment under very specific cultural and ideological constraints and were designed 
to achieve a certain set of ends. Our ability to chart how terror exerts an influence 
in a given text like the Appeal or Dred, as well as in a particular context like nineteenth- 
century abolition, may allow us to think more deeply about how and why the contem­
porary moment is so thoroughly marked by various rhetorics of terror. Reading 
abolitionist sentimentality precisely for the powerful way it mobilizes figurations of 
apocalypse to inspire terror in its audience could allow us to uncover the often 
insidious motivations behind and anticipate the possible consequences of contem­
porary deployments of terror when they occur. This cultural work begins, at least 
in part, when we recognize that incitements to terror are always tactical; they have 
histories and make sense only in context. And few settings provide a better blue­
print for reading contemporary deployments of terror than die sentimental imaginary 
of nineteenth-century abolition.
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